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II\TFORMATIONI  AFTER THE FEIRA EUROPEAN COUNTCIL
REGARDING ESDP
Developments  concerning  the European Security and Defence Policy keep moving ahead
very quickly. Further to the note on the same matter sent on the 14'" April, we have
compiled an up to date information pack to keep you abreast of events.
IIIDEX:
1.  Background briefing on ESDP
2.  Nlodel speech for delegations on ESDP
3.  Presidency Report on ESDP agreed at Feira
4.  Speech by Commissioner Patten to the Institut Franqais des Relations
Internationales (l 5.6.2000)
5.  Glossar_v of acronyms  most commonl,v  used in the area of ESDP.
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BRIEFING  FOR DELEGATIONS  REGARI}ING CESDP
IN THE WA.KE OF THE FEIRA SUMMIT
I.  Framing  o.f a common delbnce policJt which might lead to a common dqfence (art.I7.I
TEU) - Progress to date
1.1.  Background  to the issues
In the language  of the Vienna [iuropean  Council, "in order for the European Union
to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, the CFSP must
be backed by credible operational capabilities".  The priority has therefore been the
development  of such a capabilirty.
The Vienna European Council rvelcomed the Franco-British  Declaration of St
Nlalo of December 4'r' 1998 w,hich constituted a concrete step tor,vards the
implementation  of the Amsterdam  Treaty before its entry into force and inl'ited
German Presidency to progre:ss ESDP.
.  The Cologne European Council made a Declaration on strengthening  the
common European policy on security and defence. The Declaration set the
objectives, guiding principles and principal institutional  arrangements  for the nerv
policy.
1.2. State o.f PIay after the Helslt:I! CoUSI!
I  The Helsinki European Coung.|! took concrete decisions implementing  the Cologne
European Council Declaration - in practice to build up EU operational  capabilities.
.  This began with the double-hatting of N{r Solana as
.  Secretary General of the EU Council Secretariat and High
Representative  for the CFSP and
o  Secretary General of the WEU (decided formally on WEU side 23
November 1999 at WEU Ministerial in Lurembourg).
.  An important catalyst was the Franco-British summit of November  t 999.
r  The Finnish
securitv and
Presidency prepralsd trvo progress
defence covering decision-making,
reports for Helsinki. One on
military capabilities,  and co-
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key component. A WEU audit on collective and Member States' assets clarified the
scale and type of military forces needed for crisis management operations, where the
gaps are and how to filI them. The report for Helsinki identified a headline goal for
force surging and force deployment.
A separate progress  report on non-military aspects of crisis management. This
report is established on the basis of contributions of Member States and an
inventory of Community instruments. The report identifies  existing non-military
crisis response tools both at Union and Member States level and examines how
synergy could be improved.  The idea is to create additional capabilities (for
instance police, monitors, human rights experts),  databanks and a mechanism for
rapid co-ordination  and deployment.
Helsinki stressed that these two reports are complementary and underlined the
ability of the Union to have recourse to the whole range of political, economic,
humanitarian  and military instruments. It also underlined determination to
enhance the effectiveness  of its instruments for crisis prevention  and management.
Helsinki agreed the establishment of new interim structures, since decided formally
by GAC 15 Feb 2000.
.  a Political and Security Committee (PSC)
.  a Military Committee (Commission not full member)
o  a Civilian Crisis Management Mechanism (rvhich became a fully-fledged
committee on 22Mav 2000 and met for the first time on 16 June 2000).
.  Military staff rvithin the Council Secretariat
1.3. State of play after the Feira Council
.  The tlvo main texts adopted by the Feira European  Council are
o  Report of the Presidency on "the strengthening of ESDP"
.  A military report on the "elaboration  of the Headline Goal".
o  These documents rvere agreed lvithout debate at the GAC on 12113 June.
.  The Report of the Presidenc_v constitutes a remarkable achievement - fulfilling
entirely the mandate given by the Helsinki European Council.
.  Appropriate arrangements have been identified for the participation of third
countries in EU military crisis management,
o  Principles and modalities have been agreed for developing EU-NATO
relations.The headline goal has been further elaborated and the procedure has been
agreed for holding a successful Capabilities  Commitment Conference in the
aufumn.
The Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management  has been set up.
The study to define concrete targets in the area of civilian aspects of crisis
management has been cr)ncluded and concrete targets have been identified
for civilian police.
.  Conflict prevention  has been recognised  as an area where EU action can be
improved.
Definition of Treaty changes needed to establish final structure ESDP and procedures  has
been left to the Nice Council - it is the only controversial point of substance. It means that
the transfer of WEU functions to EU and operational implications,  and the establishment
of modalities  for the "legacy" o,f WEU is also left to French Presidency.
Regarding the Military Aspects of Crisis lVlanagement,  the Presidency  Report
establishes  the following:
o  a capabilities commitment conference will be held under F Presidencv.
o EU decision-making autonoffiy,  military efficiencv.
o  Interim Military Body to make proposals on headline goals and det'ine
capabilities needs together with DSACETIR and NATO experrs, (taking
NATO defence planning and possible contribution of non-EU I{ATO
countries into consideration). These proposals to be basis for MS reflections
on national commitments.
o  Further reflection on issur: of interim bodies becoming  permanent.
o  Co-operation  with other countries (Ukraine, Canada, Russia etc) welcomed.
o  4 EU/NIATO working grc,ups to be established: Security issues, Capabilities
goals, EU access to NA.TO assets, permanent EU/NATO collaboration
arrangements (Comm. not to participate in  specifically military
discussions).
I On the Civilian Aspects of Crisis lVlanagement  the Presidency Report covers:
o  enhancement of non-military crisis response tools - special emphasis on
rapid reaction,
o  achieved establishment of civilian crisis management committee,
o  Councilco-ordinatingmechanism,
.  staft on data-base provisilon rvith police,
.  collaboration  with HR's situation centre.o  study on concrete targets, police target 5000 policemen by 2003, 1000 of
which deployable within 30 days.
1,4. Follow-up
.  French Presidency by Nice should:
.  Propose headline goal (after pledging  conference)
o  Make interim bodies permanent after Nice
.  Include WEU Petersberg tasks in EU
o  Implement decisions on third country participation  and consultation with
NATO
.  Develop EU non-military  crisis and set targets
.  HR and Comm to make recommendations  to improve EU conflict prevention tools
.  A new politico-military  working group should be set up*** r.  *. ** ** *f*
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MODEL SPEECH ON BSDP FOR COMMISSION DELEGATIONS
l. ESDP in general
2. The role of the Commission
1. ESDP in general
Background
r A common  security and defence trlolicy has been an aspiration  of the EU since it's very
early days - as shown by the French-proposed and French-defeated  European Defence
Community of 1958, the Plan Fouchet, etc.
o The adoption of the three-pillar structure after Maastricht and Amsterdam placed ESDp
within CFSP, the second, inter-institutional  pillar.
Treaty basis
I The Treaty basis for ESDP is Article 17.1 of the Amsterdam  Treaty, which speaks of
the 'progressive  framing of a comrrrcrl defence policy (...) which might lead to a
common  defence', considers the WIIU the partner rvith operational  capabilities, and
suggests its potential incorporation into the Union. Furthermore.  it proposes to support
this 'progressive  framing' by co-ope:ration  in the field of armament.
o Article 17.2 specifically' includes the so-called Petersberg  tasks among the questions
covered by CESDP, to wit: humanitilrian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks
of combat forces in crisis managemernt, including peacemaking.
International implications  of ESDIP
r For the member states. but also fcrr all the countries in Europe and in the international
community,  a politically strong and security-minded EU is a huge advantage in ensuring
peace and stability in Europe and in rthe rvorld,
o This does not mean that the EU forgets its traditional alliance r.vith NATO: in fact. EU-
led operations will normally have recourse to NATO assets. The Atlantic Alliance will
remain the cornerstone for collective defence.
o NATO is a unique and ineplaceable  instrument for transatlantic cooperation and
consultation. ESDP, however, will mean that EU operations  are possible as well, relying
on self-sufficient  means, which up to now has not been the case.
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thirds of all humanitarian  assistance, and one third of the UN budget, but it is clearly not
good enough solely to foot the bill. Only if the EU acquires the means to carry out on its
own the missions that its security and defence policy demand will it have a defined
identiry - the lack of that capability has been a severe obstacle to the development  of a
coherent EU foreign policy.
Recent developments
r Since the ratification  of the Amsterdam  Treaty, and spurred by external events such as
the Kosovo crisis, developments concerning  the CESDP have moved ahead rapidly.
Notable milestones have been the Cologne, Helsinki and Feira Councils.
r The decisions  taken in these summits should end the inconsistency  between the EU's
economic  and political presence in r.vorld affairs. The necessary capabilities that allow an
effective and efficient external policy can and will be developed now by the lJnion.
High Representative
r The first step in the process was the double-hatting of Mr Solana as Secretary General
of the EU Council Secretariat  and High Representative  for the CFSP (a new position
created by the Amsterdam  Treaty) and Secretary  General of the WEU.
Nerv structures
r New and tailor-made structures in the political and military areas are being set up in
Brussels in order to enable decision-making in crisis situations. The emerging framework
incorporates  both military and non-military bodies and capabilities. The final structure
will not be decided until the Nice Summit.
r Three committees  have been created for the interim period: The interim Military Body
(iMB), the interim Political and Security Committee  (iPSC), and the Civilian Cnsis
Management Committee (CCMC). Furthermore,  military staff from Member States have
been seconded to the Council Secretariat to provide military expertise.
o It is foreseen that these interim bodies become permanent. The seconded national
military experts will eventually form the Military Staff of the Council (MS)
o The iPSC is tasked to r.vork in close co-operation with the HR, to prepare
recommendations  on the future functioning of CESDP and to deal with day-to-day  CFSP
affairs. The existing Political Committee  rvill deal with strategic and longer term matters.
Military capabilities
o In the military capabilities field. Member States will develop common capabilities for
crisis management, following the adoption of a headline goal that all members will have
to work towards - to be able by 2003 to deploy within 60 days a force of up to 60,000
men and sustain it on the ground for at least one year, in order to implement the so-called
Petersberg  tasks. The iMB has that task as its main priority. A Capabilities Commitment
Conference is scheduled for this autumn - NB. Germany has already pledged 20,000 men
and to cover 20% of the cost.Civilian capabilities
o The EU is also determined to develop its civilian capabilities, improve their
effectiveness and combine them with national ones; the non-military side of crisis
management cannot be ignored. The array of matters under this headline is vast: police
and security institutions, human rights protection, electoral supervision, independent
media support, reconstruction, demilitarisation, border management,  de-mining,
disarmament, etc. To avoid falling into generalisations and lack of practical
commitments, the Union is working towards the development of concrete targets. At
Feira, a target for civil police has lSeen set: to have 5,000 deployable  policemen by 2003,
1,000 of which could be deployed within 30 days. Further work is taking place.
r The area of conflict prevention has been identified at Feira as one where significant
improvements  can and should be made.
WEU/NATO
.  All WEU tasks except territorial defence are being transferred to the Council
Secretariat.
o Great care is being taken in developing a close working relationship with NATO, Four
'ad hoc' working groups have been created on the issues identified in the context of
EUAIATO relations: security issues, capabilities goals, modalities enabling EU access to
NATO assets and capabilities  and the definition of permanent arrangements  for EU -
NATO consultation.
Third Countries
o Several institutional  imbalances exist, there are EU members who are not part of
NATO (Ireland, Austria, Finland and Srveden), NATO members  not in the EU (USA,
Canada, Iceland and Norway), and NATO members r.vho are candidates for accession to
the EU (Czech Republic,  Hungary, Poland and Turkey). This entails competing
decision-making frameworks  and diverse public support in the area of security and
defence.
o A major aim is to ensure a coherent svstem of decision-making which avoids
duplication and allows all states involved to contribute according to their political will
and operational  capacity.
2. Role of the Commission
r The Commission is fully associated  with CFSP, which includes ESDP. However, the
level of the Commission's involvennent is less prominent in areas with a strong emphasis
on military aspects as opposed to those with significant Community  elements.
.  In the related areas of non-military crisis management and conflict prevention
specifically, and thanks to its experience  and institutional knowledge,  the Commission
has an important input to make. Delegations  on the ground are particularly well
positioned  to play a leading role.
o A Commission proposal for the creation of a Rapid Reaction Facility, to complement
the humanitarian resources of the lluropean Community Humanitarian  Office (ECHO),was adopted on the 1te A.pril and is being discussed in the Council. This will allow the
disbursement of funds within days for crisis prevention and management. Funding will
be for a limited time and be followed by longer term funding.
.  The Commission is fully associated  with the new iPSC and the Civilian Crisis
Management Committee,  but for the time being is excluded from the iMB.
r The seffing up of an EU military structure does not always concern the Commission  or
Community  responsibilities directly. The Commission does not have military expertise
or competence. Nevertheless, in areas such as the defence industry or military support to
humanitarian  operations, the Commission  can make significant contributions
Conclusion
e CFSP has long been criticised as too little, usually too late and for being the diplomacy
of declarations.  Now it is set to become an operational  contribution  to the EU's foreign
relations.  There remains much to be done, however.COUFTCIL OF
THE EUROPEAN  UNIO]!{
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Delegations will find attached the final version of the Presidency Report to the European Council at
Feira on "Strengthening  the Common European Security and Defence Policy".
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9t49t00PRESIDENCY  REPORT
TO THE FEIRA EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON
''STRENGTHENING THE COMMON
EUROPEAN  POLICY ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE''
I. INTRODUCTION
In Cologne, the European Council expressed its resolve that the EU should play its full role
on the international stage and that to that end the EU should be provided with all the
necessary means and capabilities  to assume its responsibilities regarding a common
European  policy on security and defence. Since Cologne, the European  Union has
been engaged in a process aiming at building the necessary means and capabilities
which w,ill allow it to take decisions on, and to carry out, the full range of conflict
prevention  and crisis management  tasks defined in the Treaty on European  Union
("Petersberg tasks"). These developments are an integral part of the enhancement of
the Common Foreign and Security Policy and are based on the principles set out in
Helsinki. The Union rvill contribute  to international  peace and security in
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.
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9149t002. Having approved the two Finnish Presidency progress reports on military and
non-military aspects of crisis management, including the common European headline
goal and the collective capabilities goals, the European Council in Helsinki asked the
Portuguese  Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High  Representative, to
carry work forward in the General Affairs Council on all aspects, as a matter of
priority. The Portuguese  Presidency was invited to draw up a first progress report to
the Lisbon European Council and an overall report to be presented to the Feira
European Council contairLing  appropriate recommendations  and proposals, as well as
an indication of whether or not Treaty amendment is judged necessary,
A first progress report, re1flecting the work carried forward by the Presidency,
together with the Secretary-General/High  Representative, r,vithin the General Affairs
Council was presented to the Lisbon European Cor.rncil. The European Council of
Lisbon welcomed  the progress  already achieved and in particular the fact that rhe
interim bodies had been er;tablished  and had started to function effectively  and that
the Council had identified  a process for elaborating  the headline goal and identifying
national contributions so as to meet the military capability  target.
The European Council in Lisbon looked fonvard to the further rvork that the
Presidency, together with the Secretary-General/High  Representative, would pursue
in the Council and to the F'residency's  overall report to the Feira European Council,
including proposals on the: involvement of third countries in EU military crisis
management and the further development of the EU's relationship rvith NATO.
The Lisbon European Council furtherrnore  appreciated rvhat had been achieved in
the non-military crisis management  track and invited the Council to establish by, or
at, Feira a Conrmittee  for Civilian Crisis Manasement.
3.
4.
5.
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EN6.  Since then, work has been carried forward on all aspects of military and non-military
crisis management and substantive progress  has been made, in particular  with the
identification  of appropriate arrangements  for the participation of third countries to
EU military crisis management,  as well as of principles and modalities for
developing EU-NATO relations. The headline goal has been further elaborated; a
committee  for civilian aspects of crisis management has been set up; a coordinating
mechanism, fully interacting with the Commission services,  has been established  at
the Council Secretariat; the study to define concrete targets in the area of civilian
aspects of crisis management  has been concluded;  concrete targets for civilian police
have been identifred.
7.  The Presidency submits herewith its overall report to the Feira European  Council covering.
in Chapter II, the military aspects and, in Chapter III, the non-military  aspects of
crisis management. Work has also been canied out on conflict prevention,  The
usefulness  of finding ways of improving the coherence  and effectiveness of the EU
action in the field of conflict prevention  has been recognised.
8.  In the course of the'uvork  during the Presidency on the strengthening of military and non-
military crisis management  and conflict prevention,  the importance has been
underlined  of ensuring an extensive relationship in crisis management by the Union
betrveen the military and civilian fields, as well as cooperation betrveen the EU
rapidly-evolving  crisis management capacity and the LN, OSCE and the Council of
Europe.
g.  In presenting this report, the Presidency has taken note of the fact that Denmark has
recalled Protocol No 5 to the Amsterdam Treaty on the position of Denmark.
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E1Til.  MILITARY ASPECTS OF CRISIS MAIYAGEMENT
l.
A.
2.
Elaboration of the Headline and the collective  capabilities goals
Concerning  the development  of the Headline  and the collective capabilities goals, the
General Affairs Council, rr:inforced with Ministers of Defence, concluded  at its
meeting of 20 March that the "Food for thought" paper on the "Elaboration of the
Headline Goal", including the timetable set out therein leading to a Capabilities
Commitment Conference to be convened by the end of 2000, constitutes  a basis for
future work to be conducted by the competent bodies.
The General Affairs Counc:il, at its session of 13 June, rvith the participation of
Ministers of Defence, appr,oVed the work carried out by the Interim Military Body
and forwarded  through the IPSC, up to the "First Seminar of National Experts in
Defence Planning" held in Brussels on 22-21May 2000. The Council, inviting the
competent bodies to continue on that basis, adopted the following guidelines for
further work:
The development of the Headline  and collective capabilities goals, which have
been agreed at the European Council in Helsinki, should be conducted by the 15,
in accordance  with the decision-making autonomy  of the EU as well as the
requirements regarding rnilitary effi c iency.
The Interim Military Body, rvith the political guidance of the IPSC, rvill propose
the elements  which will encompass  the Headline Goal.
In order to do this, the Interim Military Body rvill identify the capabilities
necessary for the EU to respond to the full range of the Petersberg  Tasks.
9149i00 AG/cc
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Member States contributions, the IMB, including representatives from capitals,
will also call meetings with DSACEUR  and NATO experts in order to draw on
NATO's military expertise on the requirements of the Headline  and collective
capabilities goals.
In this connection, transparency and dialogue between  the EU and NATO rvill in
addition be provided by the Ad Hoc Working Group on the capabilities  goal
provided for in Appendix 2.
The Headline Goal requirements agreed by the IMB at CHODs level rvill, after
endorsement by the Council, be the basis for the Member  States in considering
their initial offers of national contributions to the Headline Goal. These
contributions r,vill be examined by the Interim Military Body. This process nrust
be concluded before the convening of the Capability Commitment Conference.
It rvill be important to ensure coherence,  for those Member States concerned, rvith
NATO's  defence planning  process and the Planning and Review Process.
In accordance with the determination  expressed at Helsinki and Lisbon, once the
needs and resources available have been identified, Member  States rvill announce,
at the Capability Commitment Conference, their comrnitments with a vierv to
enabling the EU to fulfil the Headline Goal and the collective capabilities  goals.
It will be also important to create a review mechanism for measuring progress
tor.vards the achievement of those qoals.
9149t00 AG/cc
DG E VIII
6
E1\B.
The European Union rvill encourage  third countries to contribute through
supplementary commitments.  In order to enable those countries to contribute to
improving European military capabilities, appropriate  arrangements will be made
by the incoming presiclency  regarding the Capabilities Commitment  Conference.
These alrangements will take into account the capabilities of the six non-EU
European NATO members. The offers of capabilities already made by Turkey,
Poland, the Czech Republic and Norway are welcomed.
Recommendations  on the institutional development  of the new permanent
political and military bodies related to the CESDp within the EU
The interim political and rnilitary bodies were established on I March 200A. In rhe
light of the experience gained since their establishment, r.vork has been carried out on
the institutional development of the new perrnanent political and military bodies, in
accordance with the Helsinki conclusions.  Further rvork is under way, in order to
ensure as soon as possible the start of the permanent phase and of the EU operational
capacity for crisis management.
Proposals on appropriate  arrangements  to be concluded  by the Council on
modalities  of consultation and/or participation that rvill allow the third States
concerned to contribute to EU military crisis management
Work has been carried forward on the modalities of consultation and/or participation
concerning  the non-EU European  NATO members and other countries who are
candidates for accession to the EU.
C.
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EI\In this context, the aim has been to identify, in accordance  with the Helsinki
conclusions,  alrangements for dialogue, consultation  and cooperation on issues
related to crisis management  ensuring the decision-making autonomy of the EU.
These iurangements will provide for the interim period meetings with the
abovementioned countries, which will take place within a single inclusive structure
and will supplement the meetings held as part of the reinforced  political dialogue on
CFSP matters. Within this structure there will be exchanges with the non-Eu NATO
European members when the subject matter requires it. For the perrnanent  phase,
arrangements  will take into account the different needs arising in the routine phase
and in the operational  phase. The outcome of the Council deliberations  is contained
in Appendix 1 to this report.
Exchanges  took place on 11 May 2000 between the EU Member  States' Political
Directors and their counterparts of the non-Eu NATO European  members  and other
candidate countries as rvell as betrveen the EU Member  States' Political Directors
and their counterparts of the non-Eu NATO European members.
Russia, Ukraine, other European States engaged in political dialogue r,vith the Union
and other interested States, may be invited to take part in EU-led operations. In this
context, the EU rvelcomes the interest shown by Canada.
The French Presidency is invited, together with the Secretary  General/High
Representative, to carry fonvard further rvork rvithin the General Affairs Council in
order to make initial proposals to the Nice European  Council on appropriate
arrangements for consultation  and/or participation to allow these other prospective
partners to contribute to EU-led military crisis management.
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EFID.  Proposals on principles  for consultation with NATO on military issues and
recommendations  on developing  modalities for EU/NATO relations, to permit
cooperation on the appropriate military response to a crisis
The Council has identified the pnnciples on the basis of which consultation and
cooperation with NATO should be developed. As to modalities, the Council  has
recommended that the EU should propose to NATO the creation of four "ad hoc
working groups" between the EU and NATO on the issues which have been
identified in that context: security  issues, capabilities goals, modalities enabling EU
access to NATO assets and capabilities and the definition of perrnanenr affangements
for EU-lrlATO consultatio.n.
The outcome of the Council deliberations is contained in Appendix 2 to this reporr.
E.  Indication of whether or not Treaty amendment  is judged necessarv
The existing provisions of the TEU define the questions relating to the security of the
Union, including the progrressive framing of a common  defence policy as part of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy governed by Title V of the Treaty, On this
basis, the Council has decirled to establish the interim Political and Security
Committee  and the Interim Military Body, and to reinforce the Council Secretariat
with military experts seconded from Member States. Article 17 TEU expressly
includes the Petersberg  tasl;s in the CFSP. The Presidency took note of the opinion
of the Council Legal Sen'ic:e the conclusion  of rvhich reads as follorvs:
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and Helsinki European Councils regarding European security and defence policy can
be implemented without it being legally necessary to amend the Treaty on European
Union. Howev,er,  such amendments  would be necessary if the intention is to transfer
the Council's decision-making powers to a body made up of officials, or to amend
the Treaty's provisions regarding the WEU. Furthermore,  it is for Member States to
determine whether amendments  to the Treaty would be politically  desirable  or
operationally appropriate. "
The Presidency suggests that the issue of Treaty revision should continue to be
examined betrveen the Feira and Nice European Councils.
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EhlIII.  CIVILIAII ASPECTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT
The Presidency has, together with the Secretary GeneraVHigh  Representative,
responded  as a matter of priority to the Helsinki European Council's invitation to
carry work forward on all aspects of civilian crisis management, as defined in
Annex 2 to Annex IV to the Helsinki conclusions.
The aim of this work has been to enhance and better coordinate  the Union's and the
Members States' non-military  crisis management response tools, with special
emphasis  on a rapid reacttion capability. This will also improve the EU's contribution
to crisis management operations led by international and regional organisations.
As a concrete  result of this intensive lvork, the follorving measures have been taken:
l.
2.
3.
(a) A committee for civilian raspects of crisis management has
decision adopted on22 May 2000. The committee held its
l6 June 2000.
been set up by u Council
first meeting  on
(b) A coordinating mechanism, fully interacting with the Commission services, has been
set up at the Council Secretariat. Further developing the inventory of Member States
and Union resources relev:rnt for non-military  crisis management, it has, as a first
priority, established a datalbase on civilian police capabilities in order to maintain and
share information, to propose capabilities initiatives  and to facilitate the definition of
concrete targets for EU Member States collective non-military response.  The
coordinating mechanism hras further developed its close cooperation  r.vith the interim
Situation centre/crisis cell established  by the secrerary General/High
Representative.
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expertise of the Member States and on the results of the seminar on civilian crisis
management in Lisbon on 3-4 April 2000, has been carried out to define concrete
targets in the area of civilian aspects of crisis management.  This study identifies
priorities on which the EU will focus its coordinated efforts in a first phase, rvithout
excluding the use of all the other tools available to the Union and to Member  States.
Concrete targets for civilian police capabilities  have been identified and are set out in
Appendix 4. In particular, Member States should, cooperating voluntarily,  as a final
objective by 2003 be able to provide up to 5000 police officers for international
missions across the range of conflict prevention  and crisis management  operations
and in response to the specific needs at the different stages of these operations.
Within the target for overall EU capabilities,  Member States undertake  to be able to
identify and deploy, rvithin 30 days, up to 1 000 police officers. Furlhern-rore, rvork
will be pursued to develop EU guidelines and references lor international  policing.
1.  In addition to these measures, the Council has received and is examining  the
Commission's  proposal for a Council Regulation  creating a Rapid Reaction Facility
to support EU activities as outlined in the Helsinki Report.
(d)
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1.  The French Presidency is invited, together with the Secretary General/High
Representative, to carry work forward within the General Affairs Council on
strengthening the Common European Security and Defence Policy. The French
Presidency is invited to report to the European Council in Nice, in particular on:
(a)  the elaboration of the heaclline goal and the collective capabilities goal agreed at
Helsinki, including results reached at the Capabilities Commitment  Conference to be
convened  before Nice:
(b)  the establishment of the perrnanent  political and military structures to be put in place
as soon as possible after the Nice European Council;
(c)  the inclusion in the EU of the appropriate functions of the WEU in rhe field of the
Petersberg tasks;
(d)  the implementation of the Feira decisions on :
the arrangements'that rvill allorv consultations  r,vith and participation of third
countries in EU-le:d military crisis manaqement.
the development of the arrangements  ensuring consultation and cooperation
with NATO in military crisis management  on the basis of the work
undertaken in the relevant EU-NATO "ad hoc r.vorking groups";
(e)  the development and the implementation of EU capabilities in civilian aspecrs of
crisis management,  includirng the definition of concrete targets.
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Et{2.  The issue of Treaty revision should continue to be examined between the Feira and
Nice European Councils.
3.  The Secretary  GeneralAligh Representative and the Commission  are invited to
submit to the Nice European Council, as a basis for further work, concrete
recommendations on how to improve the coherence  and the effectiveness of the
European Union action in the field of conflict prevention,  fully taking into account
and building upon existing instruments, capabilities and policy guidelines.
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ARRANGEMENTS TO BE CONCL,UDED BY THE COUNCIL  OFI MODALITIES  OF
CONSULTATION  AND/OR P,{RTICIPATION THAT WILL ALLOW THE
NON-EU EUROPEAN  NATO MEMBERS
AND OTHER COUNTRIES  WHICH,{,RE CANDIDATES FOR ACCESSION  TO THE EU
TO COI{TRIBUTE  TO EU MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Mandate
L  In the Helsinki European Council Conclusions  the Portuguese Presidency is "...invited to report
to the European  Council in Feira on the progress  made, including (...) proposals on appropriate
alrangements to be concluded by the Council on modalities of consultation and/or participation
that rvill allorv the third States concerned to contribute to EU militarv crisis manasenlent".
Guiding Principles
2.  The Union r.vill ensure the necessary dialogue, consultation  and cooperation  rvith non-EU
European NATO members and other countries rvho are candidates for accession  to the EU on
EU-led crisis manasement.
3.  Appropriate arrangements 
"vill 
be established for dialogue and information  on issues related to
security and defence policy and crisis rnanagement.
4.  There rvill be full respect for the decision-nraking  autonomy of the EU and its single
institutional  framer,vork.
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EN5't. There will be a single, inclusive structure in which all the lScountries  concerned (the non-EU
European  NATO members and the candidates for accession to the EU) can enjoy the necessary
dialogue, consultation  and cooperation with the EU.
6. There rvill, within this structure, be exchanges with the non-EU European NATO members
where the subject matter requires it, such as on questions concerning the nature and functioning
of EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities.
Modalities
7. Modalities for the participation of non-EU European  I.{ATO members and candidate  countries,
to be established for the permanent phase, rvill need to take into account  the different needs
arising in different situations:
routine non-crisis phase: mechanism for a regular dialogue;
operational  phase, including trvo stages:
(a)  pre-operational  phase rvhen options for action are considered, in rvhich dialogue and
consultations will be intensified;
(b)  operational  phase "stricto sensu", r.vhich starts 'uvhen the Council takes the decision to
launch an operation,  and an ad hoc Committee of Contributors is set up.
Full account should be taken of the role of the Secretary  General/High  Representative  in
the EU's CFSP and CESDP.
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8. Until the implementation of the modalities established for the permanent phase, meetings with
the 15 countries concemed (non-EU liuropean NATO members and other candidates for
accession to the EU) will take place u'ithin the single inclusive structure referred to in
paragraph 5. The choice of the approltriate  form and modalities will be based on considerations
of pragmatism  and efficiency, depending on the circumstances, subject-matter and needs.
9. A minimum of two meetings in EU+l5 format will be organised in each Presidency on ESDP
matters. These r,vill supplement the meetings held as part of the reinforced political dialogue on
CFSP matters.
10. Within this framework, a minimum of't$'o meetings rvill be organised with the six non-EU
European  NATO members (in EU+6 fbrmat) in each Presidencrr'. Additional exchanges  w,ill be
organised if the need arises upon decis,ion by the Council or the IPSC.
1 1. A meeting at Ministerial level within the framervork  referred to in paragraph 8, will be
organised in each Presidency r.vith the 15 and rvith the 6.
12. The exchanges provided for in paragraphs  9 and 10 rvill cover the elaboratien  of the headline
and capability goals as rvell, so as full;', to inform non-EU members of ongoing rvork on the list
of necessary means. In order to enable those countries to contribute to improving European
military capabilities,  appropriate arran,gernents  rvill be made by the incoming Presidencv
regarding the capabilities pledging corLference.  These arrangements  will take into account the
capabilities  of the 6 non-EU European  NATO members.
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EI\;  For the permanent phase
Routine Phase
13. Exchanges  on issues related to security and defence policy and, in particular, on progress r,vithin
the EU in establishing  its crisis-management capabilities,  will take place during the routine
phase.
14. During the routine phase there should be, in the course of each semester,
regular meetings in EU+15 format, at the appropriate level;
at least two meetings with the participation of the non-EU European  NATO members in
EU+6 formatr
additional meetings u,ill be organised if the need arises upon decision by the CounciI or the
PSC.
PSC r,vill play a leading role in the implementation  of these arrangements,  rvhich should also
include exchanges at military level,
15. Arrangements  for Ministerial meetings during the perrnanent  phase rvill be based upon the
experience gained during the interim phase,
16. The exchanges will facilitate participation of the concerned  countries to EU-led operations.
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(a) Pre-operationalphase
17 . In the event of a crisis, dialogue  and consultation will be intensified.
18. When the possibility of an EU-led military crisis management operation is under consiCeration,
these consultations will provide a framervork  for exchanges  of views and discussion  on any
related security concems raised by the countries concerned. Where the EU recourse to NATO
assets is under active consideration,  particular attention will be given to consultation with the
six non-EU European NATO membr:rs.
(b) Operational  phase "stricto sensu"
19. When deciding  on the military optio:n, the EU will address participation of non-Eu NATO
members  and other countries which rare candidates to accession  to the EU according  to the
provisions agreed in Helsinki:
"Upon a decision by the Council to launch an operation,  the non-EU European NATO members
will participate if they so wish, in the event of an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets
and capabilities.  They rvill, on a decision by the Council, be invited to take part in operations
where the EU does not use NATO as,sets.
Other countries rvho are candidates for accession to the EU may also be invited by the Council
to take part in EU-led operations once the Council has decided to launch such an operation."
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ENI2'A. The operational  phase will start when the Council decides to launch a military crisis
management operation.  Those non-EU European NIATO members and countries candidates  for
accession which have confirmed their participation in an EU-led operation by deploying
significant military forces, will have the same rights and obligations as the EU participating
Member States in the day to day conduct of that operation.
21. An ad hoc committee  of contributors will be set up comprising all EU Member States and the
other participating countries for the day to day conduct of the operation.  The CouncillPSC will
be responsible for the political control and strategic direction of the operation.  For the military
day to day conduct of the operation,  functions  and roles of the MC and of the operation
commander will be set out in the relevant arransements.
22. The decision to end an operation shall be taken by the Council after consultation  between
participating states within the ad hoc committee of contributors.
*{(
>k
23. The Council will formalise the necessary arransements in due time and will examine the
options for doing so.
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PRINCIPLES FOR CONSULTATION  WITH NATO ON MILITARY  ISSUES
AND RECOMMENDAT'IONS ON DEVELOPING  MODALITIES
FOR T]U/NATO RELATIONS
The Mandate
The European  Council in Helsinki invitecl the Portuguese  Presidency to report to the European
Council in Feira on the progress  made, including  "proposals on principles for consultation rvith
NATO on military issues and recommenclations  on developing modalities for EUNATO  relations,
to permit cooperation on the appropriate rnilitary response to a crisis, as set out in Washington and
at Cologne".
The Principles
Development of consultation  and s6aperstion  between the EU and NATO must take place in
full respect of the autonomy of EU decision-making.
The EU and NATO have undertaken further to strengthen and develop their cooperation  in
military crisis-management on the barsis of shared values, equality and in a spirit of partnership.
The aim is to achieve full and effective consultation,  cooperation  and transparency in order to
identify and take rapid decisions on the most appropriate military response to a crisis and to
ensure efficient crisis-management. In this context, EU-objectives in the field of military
capabilities  and those arising, for thos;e countries concerned, fiom NATO's Defence
Capabilities  Initiative, will be mutually reinforcing.
t.
2.
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9149/003. While being mutually reinforcing in crisis management,  the EU and NATO are organisations  of
a different nature. This will be taken into account in the arrangements  concerning their
relations and in the assessment to be made by the EU of existing  procedures  governing
WEU-NATO relations with a view to their possible adaptation to an EU-NATO framework,
4. Arrangements  and modalities for relations between the EU and NATO will reflect the fact that
each Organisation  will be dealing with the other on an equal footing.
5. In the relations between  the EU and NATO as institutions, there will be no discrimination
against any of the Member States.
ISSUES AND MODALITIES FOR THE INTEzuiVI PERIOD
Contacts rvith NATO (informal  contacts  by SGs, briefings by the Portuguese  Presidency  at the
NAC) have taken place in accordance with the Helsinki definition for the initial phase in rvhich the
EU-interim bodies have concentrated on establishing themselves. There is now a need for a further
evolution in EU-NATO relations.
A.  Issues
1.  Securif-v*: EU efforts torvards finalising its orvn security arrangements  (physical and personal
security,  and rvork torvards  an EU security  agreement)  are an absolute priority.  On this basis,
the Union u'ill have to establish a dialogue with NATO to define security arrangements
between the two organisations. These discussions should lead to an agreement,  rvhich rvill
govern inter alia information  exchange  and access by designated  officials from the EU and its
Member States to NATO planning structures.
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3.
Defining capability goals: to ensure that "these objectives and those arising, for those
countries concerned, from NATO's Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI) will be mutually
reinforcing",  modalities for consultation  on these issues will need to be established. These
modalities should permit the EU to draw, as needed, on NATO military expertise,  as the EU
elaborates its headline goal by drawing on Member State contributions. Having elaborated the
headline and capability goals, the E[J, as agreed in Helsinki, will develop a method of
consultation  through which these gc'als can be met and maintained,  and through which national
contributions reflecting Member States' political will and commitment towards these goals can
be defined by each Member State, u,ith a regular review of progress made. In addition,
Member States would use existing defence planning procedures including, as appropriate,  those
available in NATO and the Planningl  and Review Process of the PfP.
Arrangements enabling  the EU access to NATO assets and capabilities (Berlin and
Washington agreements): Helsinki and Cologne defined trvo approaches  to implementing EU
operations: rvith or without NATO assets. To use NATO assets, it is important to make
progress on defining together how ttris will work in practice in order to draw up an agreement.
This agreement  should be ready by the time the EU becomes operational. To make this
possible, the EU looks fonvard to substantial progress u,ithin NATO.
Defining permanent arrangements: Follor,ving the Feira European Council, discussion rvill
be needed to determine the nature of'the perrnanent arrangements, lvhich rvill govern relations
between  the EU and NATO. These affangements should be based upon the principles defined
above.
The groundwork undertaken on these four issues rvill pave the way for establishing  permanent
arangements  betrveen NATO and the ELl. Our aim is that these should be ready at the same time as
the EU perrnanent  structures are put in place after the Nice European Council.
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1.  The Feira European Council should decide to propose  to NATO the creation of "ad hoc
working groups" between the EU and NATO for each of the issues mentioned  above.
2.  The "ad hoc working groups" would have the following tasks:
(a) for security issuesr preparation of an EU-NATO security agreement;
(b) for capability goals: the implementation of information exchange  and discussion with NATO
on elaborating  capability goals. It is understood that DSACEUR could participate,  as
appropriate;
(c) for modalities enabling EU access to NATO assets (Berlin and Washington  agreements):
preparation of an agreement  on the modalities for EU access to NATO assets and capabilities  as
agreed at Washington  (draft framervork  agreement  on Berlin Plus implementation).  It is
understood that DSACEUR  should participate;
(d) for the definition of permanent arrangements:  defining the main parameters of an EUTNATO
agreement  which rvould formalise structures and procedures  for consultation  betrveen the t"r'o
organisations  in times of crisis and non-crisis.
3.  If, having regard to the principles set above, nerv issues were to arise rvhich were recognised  as
requiring consultation betrveen the EU and I{ATO, further "ad hoc rvorking groups" could be
considered.
1.  On the EU side, the IPSC r.vill have a coordinating role for the rvork of the "ad hoc rvorkin'
groups", and rvill be a focal point for dialogue.
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STUDY ON CONCRETE TARGETS
OI{ CryILIAI{ ASPECTS OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT
A. lntroduction
The European Council expressed its determination to increase and improve the effectiveness of the
Union's capacity to respond to crises, including by actions in civilian areas. This increased
effectiveness could be used both in response to request of a lead agency like the LIN or the OSCE,
or, where appropriate, in autononrous EtJ actions.
The Union should seek to enhance its capability in civilian aspects of crisis management in all
relevant areas, with the objective of improving  its potential for saving human lives in crisis
situations, for maintaining basic public o,rd€r, preventing further escalation, facilitating the return to
a peaceful, stable and self-sustainable situation, for managing adverse effects on EU countries  and
for addressing  relevant problems of coordination. Particular attention could be paid to those areas
where the international community so far has demonstrated rveaknesses. It r.voulJ provide "added
value" as it would improve the Union's capacity to react as well as the Union's capability to meet the
requests of the other lead organisations:  'they rvould be able to count - on a more systematic basis -
on a sizeable quantitative and qualitative contribution which could represent  the nucleus of some of
their missions. This would, in turn, increase the Union's visibility.
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all, provide it with adequate means to face complex political crises by:
acting to prevent the eruption or escalation of conflicts;
consolidating peace and intemal stability in periods of transition.
ensuring complementarity between the military and civilian aspects of crisis management
covering the full range of Petersberg  tasks.
It has been agreed that the identification  of concrete  targets should be premised on a pragmatic,
bottom-up approach, focusing on operational requirements, and reflecting the political concerns of
the European Council.
The inventories  which have been drawn up clearly shorv that Member States, the Union, or both
have accumulated considerable experience or have considerable resources in a large number of
areas, a number of which are resources already being used in development cooperation. Fully
taking into account, and building upon, existing experiences,  instruments and resources, the Union
should as a matter of priority concentrate its efforts on the areas rvhere a rapid reaction is most
needed, and rvhere the added value of an increased and coordinated effort by the Union and Member
States is most evident. This process could be built outwards step-by-step to cover a rvide range of
limited as well as complex civil crisis management  operations. Hor.vever, the identification of
priorities on which the EU rvill focus its coordinated efforts in a first phase does by no means
exclude the use of all other tools available to the Union and to Member  States.
B. Priorities
The first priority area, identified in the light of the crises Europe has had to face in recent times and
is still facing now, is police.
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Concrete targets on police capabilities,  to be reached by 2003, have been established by Member
States, cooperating voluntarily within the framework of Article 12, fifth indent, of the TEU. These
concrete  targets are elaborated in detail in Appendix 4 to the Presidency report.
II.  STRENGTHENING OF THE RULE OF LAW
Intensified work on police must necessanily be accompanied by work in other areas that are felt as
necessary if a positive outcome of a polic,e mission is to be ensured. The area most specifically
concerned is assistance for the re-establishment of a judicial and penal system. The following
measures could be considered:
(i)  Member  States could establish national arrangements for selection ofjudges, prosecutors,
penal experts and other relevant categories within the judicial and penal system, to deploy at
short notice to peace supporl operations, and consider ways to train them appropriately;
(ii)  the EU could aim at promoting guidelines for the selection and training of international  judges
and penal experts in liaison with the United Nations and regional organisations  (particularly
the Council of Europe and the OSCE);
(iii) the EU could consider ways of supprorting the establishment/renovation  of infrastructures  of
local courts and prisons as well as recruitment  of local court personnel and prison officers in
the context of peace support operations.
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III.  STRENGTHENING CIVIIAN ADMINISTRATION
Yet another area which it is necessary to enhance, in order to succeed in supporting  societies in
transition, is the area of civil administration.
Member States could consider improving the selection, training and deployment of civil
administration experts for duties in the re-establishment of collapsed administrative systems;
Member States could also consider takinq on the trainins of local civil administration  officials
in societies in transition.
IV.  CryIL PROTECTION{
In addition to the prionty areas mentioned before, Member  States have identified civil protection,
inctuding search and rescue in disaster relief operations. It is necessary to draw a distinction
between operations of civil protection within the framer,vork of crisis management operations, and
other types of disaster relief operations. The latter kind of operations have specific characteristics.
This being said, in crisis management operations within CFSP, it should also be possible to resort to
EU Member States' tools and capabilities for civil protection.
Even though specific coordination mechanisms already erist in the field of civil protection, it is felt
that, inthe light of experience gleaned in recent majornatural  disasters,  improvement  is needed and
is possible.
Ideas aimed at ensuring a better organisation  of the Union's reaction, such as a lead-nation concept
as well as specialisation,  have been put fonvard. Work currently under way within the Council and
involving experts in the field will permit the definition of concrete targets also in this area.
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State could make available, type of manderte and status of the operation for participating  countries  as
well as promotion of compatibility of equipment between Member States.
C. Resources
Improved  coordination at EU level can lea.d to an increased  effectiveness  and synergy in the Union's
reaction. Together with the definition of concrete targets by the European Council, this will ensure
tangible improvements  in the Union's contribution to crisis management operations.
D.  Further Work on Concrete Targets after Feira
The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Criisis Management could work on the development  and
further elaboration of the concrete targets  s;et out by Feira European Council  as well as on areas
going beyond the prionty areas already identified.  To this end, the Committee should be integrated
with experts from the relevant national adrninistrations,  i.a. providing specialist advice on police,
judicial and penal aspects, civilian administration, humanitarian  assistance as well as the interface
between crisis management and development cooperation.
Further work could also address the identilication  of national capabilities rvith a view to reaching
collective targets, taking into account naticrnal areas of expertise/specialisation.
It is noted that the Commission  will submit shortly an operational inventory of actions already led
by the Union as well as proposals in the cir,,il protection area.
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COI\CRETE TARGETS FOR POLICE
A.  CONCRETETARGETS
To develop police capabilities,  Member  States, cooperating voluntarily  within the framework of
Article 12, fifth indent, ofthe Treaty on European  Union, have set themselves  the following
concrete targets, to be reached by 2003.
The targets are related but highlight  different aspects of EU police capabilities.  In this regard, the
target for rapid deployment  capability (2) is defined as lying within the target for overall EU
capabilities  ( 1).
I.  OVERALL  EU CAPABILITIES
Recognising  the central role ofpolice in intemational crisis management  operations,  and the
increasing need for police officers for such operations, EU Member  States undertake  to
strengthen their capability to provide police officers for intemational police operations  to
which they voluntarily decide to contribute.  Member  States' contributions will take account of
their own particular arrangements  for national policing and the type ofpolice expertise which
thev can orovide.
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able to provide up to 5 000 police officers to international missions  across the range of crisis
prevention  and crisis management  operations and in response  to the specific needs at the
different stages of these operations. The current total deployment of EU Member States is
approximately 3 300 persons.
This will require the pre-identification  and training of a sufficiently large pool of police staff,
covering all fields of police work required internationally  and taking into account the
comparative  advantages  as well as the specific constraints of Member States'police. It may
also necessitate the reinforcement  oImechanisms for rotation and sufficient financial and
logistical resources.
Member States rvill share national experience with a vierv to producing specific
recolnmendations  on increasing the number of police officers available for international
missions (looking inter alia at a greater  use of retiring or recently retired officers and the
freeing-up of police capability through greater involvement of experts from adjacent fields).
In this respect, due consideration will be given to the possibility of putting a greater emphasis
on the training of local police, as this can contribute to reduce the size and period of
international  police deployments.
The target on overall EU police caprabilities may be extended to cover also international
support to localjustice and penal systems, the deficiency of rvhich in some crises can have a
significant impact on the credibility and effectiveness of an international police presence.
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The EU police deployment  can either be in response to a request from an international  lead
organisation,  in particular the United Nations or the OSCE, or can constitute  an EU
autonomous police operation, possibly as part of a larger EU-led crisis management  operation.
once the necessary EU planning and logistical framework has been defined.
Within the target for overall EU capabilities,  Member States undertake to be able to identify
and deploy, within 30 days, police able to implement operations and missions of police
advice, training, monitoring  as well as executive policing:
in order to prevent or mitigate internal crises and conflicts (such as e.g. MINUGUA  in
Guatemala):
in non-stabilised  situations,  such as e.g. immediate post-conflict situations, requiring
robust forces able to restore law and order; (such as e.g. UNMIK/KFOR  in Kosovo and
LINTAET in East Timor):
in support of local police, ensuring respect for basic human rights standards (such as e.g.
WEU/MAPE in Albania, WEUPOL  in Mostar and ONUSAL in El Salvador), and,
'uvhere intemational police performs  an executive role, allor,ving  the rapid return of
responsibility  for law enforcement to localpolice (such as e.g. OSCE/KPSS in Kosovo).
Experience has shown that the most demanding of crisis management tasks may reqLrire the
deployment  of up to 1 000 EU Member State police rvithin 30 days. For each of these generic
target missions,  further elaboration by proper Council instances rvill be needed.
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stabilised situations,  and in particular during the transition from initial military command  to
subsequent civil command, special attention will be given to the proposal for the development
of robust, rapidly deployable,  flexible and interoperable  European Union integrated police
units, as well as to the possibility of a smaller number of Member States cooperating  to build
capabilities in this specific field.
In order to reach the deployment  time target, Member States and the EU will further
strengthen,  as appropriate, the capacity to contribute with the required expertise to an advance
team headed by the international lead organisation  - as well as, in due course, deploy EU
advance teams of experienced police experts in charge of assessing the risks of, defining,
planning and establishing  an EU-led police mission. In this context, the EU should be able to
contribute  with, and deploy, legal experts in order to prepare for support to localjudicial and
penal systems,  as rvell as experts in engineering,  logistical and administrative support.
Member States will exchange information  and experience on methods of creating rapidly
deployable police forces, inter alia through the use of pre-identified  police forces rvhich, rvhile
actively taking part in national police u'ork, rvould be available at short notice for police
missions.
3.  RAISING STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICE MISSIONS
Member  States and the EU can play a catalysing  role in raising standards for international
police operations, including ivithin and through the United Nations and the OSCE. Therefore
the EU and its Member  States rvill initiate work in view of the definition of an EU concept for
intemational police operations. This work will be carried out in close cooperation  with
LIN/DPKO, on the basis of existing UN guidelines  and without duplicating work being carriecl
out in the UN, and will drarv on Member  State and EU police expertise. First discussions on
this subject have identified the need, inter alia, to:
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tasks, including priorities for deployment,  on the basis of scenarios or illustrative
profiles covering the role of police across the range of, and at the different phases of,
crisis prevention  and crisis management  operations, and taking into account the need for
fl exibility of intervention;
(2)  contribute to the development of a general concept of executive policing, notably  as regards the
interaction  between military forces and police forces in post-conflict situations where
both are deployed  in parallel;
(3)  contribute to the clarification  of the legislative framework in rvhich internationalpolice  missions
operate;
(4\  contribute  to the definition  of clear intemational mandates for nolice missions.
The development of an EU concept would facilitate the drawing up of EU guidelines and
references  for intemationalpolicing, including on rules of engagement,  as well as contribute to
the further refinement of the categories  of police and experts in Member State and EU
databases.
Member States and the EU rvill also, in the framer.vork of the cooperation in the field ofjustice
and home affairs, and taking into account  requirements of different types of police missions,
continue efforts to define standard selection criteria and basic trainrng  programmes,  based on,
and compatible  with, existing LfN, OSCE and Council of Europe standards, in order to ensure
that police sent by EU Member  States on intemational missions meet high standards and that the
pool of pre-identified  and trained police officers is sufficiently large to meet the capability and
deployment  targets defined above. These efforts rvill take into account the Lisbon seminar
organised in this context on 29-31 May 2000 and earlier work on police training for
peacekeeping  missions carried out rvithin the framework of the European Union and will reflect
the centralrole of the EU and its Member  States in contributing to improved international
policing  standards.
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The specific concrete targets are the expression of the political will and commitment of Member
States. The targets will be further elaborated by the appropriate Council instances. A method will
be developed through which these phased targets can be met and maintained  through voluntary
contributions.  The comparative  advantages of national police taking into account e.g. national
rotational  requirements and the possible use of retirees, can be defined by each Member State, with
a regular review of progress  made. This work will be carried out in close cooperation  with police
experts.
General information on pre-identified police capabilities, their readiness,  as well as on specific
national expertise, in particular for advance teams, rvill be fed into the police database established at
the Council Secretariat  as part of the Coordinating Mechanism  set up following the conclusions  of
the European  Council in Helsinki. Further work will be undertaken concerning  national
alrangements, including on specific information on pre-identified police capabilities and single
national contact points.
The European Councilin Helsinki  set the objective of developing the EU's contributions to
international  organisations, in particular the UN and OSCE, as well as its capabilities for EU
autonomous actions. To that end the EU will coordinate closely with the United Nations
Department of Peace Keeping Operations (LIN/DPKO), the OSCE, norably the REACT Task Force,
and with the Council of Europe and Member  States contact points, in order to ensure that EU efforts
and those of these organisations  are compatible  and mutually reinforcing, to avoid duplication  as
well as to facilitate the exchange of information relating to new police missions.
In addition, a detailed study on the feasibility and implications of planning, launching and leading
autonomous EU missions rvill be carried out.
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A European Foreign Policy:
Ambition and Realitv
The Right Honourable Chris Patten
Commissioner  for E xternal Relations
Institut Frangais des Relations Internationales
l5 June 2000Au temps ou j'6tais Pr6sident du parti Conservateur, val6ry Giscard
d'Estaing etait pass€ me voir juste apres avoir fait un dir.ou., a
I'Universit6 de Cambridge. Il  avart commenc6 son intervention en
exprimant  son vif plaisir d'6tre accueilli dans une des universitds  les plus
v6n6rables d'Europe. Un haut lieu de culture et d'erudition. Enfin un
endroit oil il pourrait s'exprimer dans sa propre langue! Mais ils'6tait vite
aperqu qu'autour de lui les visages de ses auditeurs 6taient d6faits a l'id6e
de cette epreuve A venir. Il avait poursuivi en frangais le temps de
quelques phrases puis, sans effort, il 6tait pass6 d l,anglais
Il prit cette d6cision empreinte de courtoisie, se rendant bien compte des
limites de son auditoire. A mon tour, je sollicite de votre part la meme
bienveillance  6tant donne mes propres insuffisances linguistiques.
1.  More than 40 years ago the European commission's  first
President, walter Hallstein, wanted to formalise the Commission's
relations with the representatives  of third countries in Brussels. President
de Gaulle slapped him down, pooh-poohing this 'artificial counrry
springing from the brow of a technocrat'. I suppose that some - not least
in what we would call, within the Commission, 'the country that I know
best' - would regard this speech as a similarly reprehensible trespass into
that artificial country. None of this is surprising. For foreign policy goes
to the heart of what it means to be a nation. And the Commission,s role is
still disputed. when it comes to trade policy or agriculture, we know
where we stand. The Commission acts, more or less, according to Jean
Monnet's brilliant vision. But what exactlyis the Common Foreign and
Security Policy? Should the Member States be willins to curb rheir
national instincts for the sake of it?
2.  These questions have never been ansrvered to anyone's
satisfaction.  History is littered with failed attempts to create a Common
Foreign and Security Policy which could be more than the sum of its
parts. The Pleven Plan; the de Gasperi Plan; the Fouchet plan...with
European Political Co-operation, in 1970, the baby at least survived.
Indeed it grew. But it was always rather a sickly creature. After twenty
years, in 1989, it boasted an impressive jungle of committees; it issued
ringing declarations  (usually a week or two after they could influenceevents); but - as some academic  commentators put it recently - "the
sffucture resembled a diplomatic game, providing work for officials
without engaging or informing Parliaments or press, let alone public
opinion. It thus failed to promote any substantial convergence  of national
attitudes."'
3.  Since then, the European Union has started to raise its game. The
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 created the Common Foreign and Security
Policy. The Amsterdam Treaty called into being the High Representative,
"Monsieur PESC". And the Helsinki European Council last December
took the first big step into defence policy. What caused this new impetus?
I would suggest three reasons in particular:
o First, the mismatch between the time and effort being put into Political
Co-operation,  and the feeble outcome, had become too glaring. As the
European Union matured in other respects, with enlargement,  the
advent of the Single Market and the drive towards a single cunency -
it became ever clearer that foreign policy was lagging behind.
o Second, the fall of the Berlin Wall changed the whole landscape of
Europe. We had always known what we were against. Now we had to
work out what we were for. And we needed to be able to tackle
instability on our borders Europe's weakness was exposed, in
particular, by our humiliating 'hour of Europe' in Bosnia, where we
could neither stop the fighting, nor bring about any serious negotiation
until the Americans chose to intervene. Europe's subsequent reliance
on US military capacity in Kosovo had a similarly galvanising effect.
The Member States recognised that they needed a genuine Common
Foreign and Security Policy to reverse this tide.
o And third, perhaps, there has been a changing relationship with the
US. American engagement in Europe since the Second World War
has been a blessing in almost every respect. Yet America has divided
us. Some Europeans - foolishly in my view - have measured their
devotion to the cause of Europe by their anti-Americanism.  Others
have shied away from a muscular European foreign policy, and
especially defence policy, for fear that this would sever the all-
important transatlantic link. Both have been wrong. And both are
coming to see it. Europe and America need one another. The danger is
not of US isolationism, but of unilateralism -  accompanied,
rAnthony  Forster and William Wallace: Policl,-making  in the European Llnion.4'"ed.  OUP 2000sometimes, by disregard for the gteat abroad. Europe will encourage
that tendency if it is not seen to be doing more for itself.
4.  So we have our new CFSP. Javier Solana, as its High
Representative, also presides over the Council Secretariat. As the
Commissioner for External Relations, I combine responsibilities which
used to be spread between several Commissioners.  I do not want to turn
this into a speech about institutions - but I should discuss very briefly one
central issue, which is the role of the Commission in the emerging
structure of CFSP.
5.  In the important advances achieved in CFSP in the last decade, the
Member States have not given the Commission a sole right of initiative;
nor, in general, have they agreed to abide by majority votes; nor do they
accept that Europe has 'occupied the space' reducing national freedom of
action. It is important to understand this, and particularly important that
the European Commission should understand it. Foreign policy remains
primarily a matter for democratically elected Member State governments.
6.  But it is equally necessary that all Member States should
acknowledge what those actually doing the work of CFSP have long
understood: that mere inter-Governmentalism is a recipe for weakness
and mediocrity: for a European foreign policy of the lowest common
denominator. That will become more and more obvious as the Union
takes in new members. The larger Member States can blunt the
deficiencies of inter-Governmentalism by playing a prominent role. As
President Chirac said in his important foreign policy speech of 30 May:
"some members can act as a driving force..." to give Europe a coherent,
high-profile foreign policy. But force of will and the appeal to shared
values are not enough. That is why the Member States decided at
Maastricht and at Amsterdam to combine the Community and the inter-
Governmental  methods. Only in this way would they be able to sing, if
not in unison, at least in closer harmony.
7.  What they came up with is far from perfect. Luckily Javier Solana
and I work extremely well together - but we are not much helped in that
by the new institutional machinery. CFSP is a work in progress which
will be further streamlined in the years to come. The important point is
that - however awkward they may be - the new structures,  procedures
and instruments  of CFSP recognise the need to harness the strengths of
the European Community in the service of European foreign policy. That
is why the Treaty 'fully associates' the European Commission with
CFSP. We participate fully in the decision-making  process in the Council,
with a shared right of initiative which we shall exercise.Our role cannot
be reduced to one of 'painting by numbers' -  simply filling in the blankson a canvas drawn by others. Nor should it be. It would be absurd to
divorce European foreign policy from the institutions which have been
given responsibility for most of the insffuments for its accomplishment:
for external trade questions, including sanctions; for European extemal
assistance; for many of the external aspects of Justice and Home Affairs.
8.  What is needed is a sensible and sensitive partnership between the
institutions of the Union and the Member States. We should be engaged
not in trench warfare, but in a common enterprise to ensure that the
world's largest trading block also makes its presence felt politically.
9.  Let me move from this institutional  hors d'oeuvre to the main
course. What we are actually trying to do together? What do the Member
States want to do with their new structures? And how should we measure
our success?
10. The EU has wide responsibilities and interests - and CFSP must
have a global reach. But, within that, we need to focus our efforts. I
suggest that the EU might set itself three overall goals:
o The first is to manage more effectively our relationships with our
nearest neighbours. The US, because of its boundless confidence in
technology, its pre-eminence  as a world power and its geographical
position, can contemplate  technical solutions such as National
Missile Defence - to the threats that it faces. Whatever scepticism or
enthusiasm  one may have about this approach - and for what it's
worth I remain to be wholly convinced - it is symptomatic of a belief
that the world can be kept at bay. Interestingly, this belief has
increased US reliance on tools (military threats and action) which, in
Europe, are a Member State competence.  In Europe, by contrast, our
geography rules out such an approach, even were we to believe in it.
We can only achieve security by engaging constructively with our
nearest neighbours. This requires the application of tools such as
trade, external assistance, political dialogue, environmental  co-
operation, competition policy and so ofl, which are matters of
Community competence. The Member States cannot, separately,
pursue a wholly effective extemal relations policy not just because
they are too small, but because such a policy depends upon
instruments over whrch they have wisely decided to pool their
resources.
o A second goal we should set ourselves is to apply our experience of
multilateral co-operation to a wider stage. The EU has been a unique,
and a uniquely successful,  experiment in regional integration. [t seeks
to preserve what is best about its members: their separate cultures,languages, traditions, and historical identities - while overcoming
what has been worst: nationalism, xenophobia,  mutually destructive
trade and monetary policies, and (ultimately) their tendency to go to
war with one another. There have been many frustrations and failures
along the way. For my own taste, the EU has been too interventionist. I sympathise with the demand that we should be more enthusiastic
about subsidiarity. The EU is sometimes wasteful and inefficient,
partly because Member States have often denied us the resources  we
need to manage our affairs better. The EU is not loved. yet it has
been a tremendous force for stability and prosperity on this continent
- and a pole of attraction for counffies .-.rging from dictatorship.
Michael Prowse suggested in a recent column in the Financial Timel
that in the coming century Europe will offer the world a .,satisfying
overall combination of individual liberty, economic opportunity and
social inclusion. It will offer the individual more personal freedom
than intolerant Asia. And the value of this freedom will be enhanced
by a sense of community and commitment to social welfare that is
largely missing in atomistic America". That is an optimistic vision. I
hope it is true. But it sets a challenge for the European Union,s
external relations, too. For the skills we are developing to manage
our own affairs are enorrnously  relevant to a world that is still
struggling to evolve an economic, legal and political framework to
contain the passions of states, to help manage rerations between them,
and to channel globalisation in beneficent directions. Not only can the
EU contribute to the world's stumbling efforts to co-operate more
effectively in multilaterar frameworks (rn the uN, the wro, and so on). But our own model of integration is inspiring regional
experiments from Asia to Latin America. And tr,rougti our
commitment to human rights we can explode the absurd notron that
there is a tension between commercial  inierests and active support for
freedom. It has long been clear to me that the freest societies are also
the best neighbours and the best places to invest and do business. The
EU's ambition must be to reflect abroad what is best about our own
model. our sense of civil society. The balance we seek to strike
between national freedoms and common disciplines.
:
o { !!4  overall goal the European Union should set itself is to become
a serious counterpart to the United States. As I have said, it is a fallacy
to imagine that there is a choice to be made betweenEuropeanism  and
Atlanticism. They are mutuaily reinforcing. we need to work closely
with the united States, which has been, and remains, a staunch friend
' Weekend  FT, 13 May 2000of Europe. There is much - very much - to admire in the US. But
there are also many areas in which I think they have got it wrong. The
I-IN, for example, environmental policy and a pursuit of extratenitorial
powers combined with a neuralgic hostility to any external authority
over their own affairs. But we will not win arguments like these unless
we are ourselves taken seriously. At present, in many areas, we are
not. Nor do we deserve to be. By working more effectively together,
developing the Common Foreign and Security Policy so that it allows
us better to project our combined potential, we may hope to conffibute
to a healthier global balance.
I 1.  Let me turn now from the general to the particular. What should be
the ambition of CFSP in key areas of policy - and how should the
European Commission  be making its contribution?
12. Our first responsibility is internal rather than external: to help
create a dynamic European economy rvhich can fuel a serious foreign
policy. "Give me the coal" said the first post-war British Foreign
Secretary, Ernie Bevin, "And I'll give you the policy". But the
Commission's external trade policy is also a crucial part of CFSP:
o First, the EU must contribute to open, rule-based
The EU must b. u .hurnpion of globulitutiot;"tti.h i  t
good not only for the economic benefits which trade can bring to the
poorest countries, but because it also serves to promote open societies
and liberal ideas. I welcome the recent WTO deal which PascalLamy
has negotiated with China;
o But globalisation is not some force of nature beyond our control. For
example, we must address the risk of  polarisation between the
connected  and the isolated. Liberal trade and advanced technology  are
*rkrrg p."pte b.tt.r 
"ffJut 
not everywhere and not in every country.
Europe spends some €11 billion a year on ice-cream. Yet 174 out of
every 1000 African children fail to reach the age of five.
13. And this brings me at once to external assistance - an area in
which the EU reality, at present, falls embarrassingly far below its
potential. The EU and its Member States account for 55oh of all ofhcial
international development assistance, and some 66% of all grant aid. Yet
the money is not well managed. In saying that, I do not want to cast
aspersions on the many excellent and dedicated staff who have worked
their hearts out trying to turn things around. But they have been saddled
with lousy procedures. And there are too few of them. EC aid volumes
have increased two or three times as fast as the staff at our disposal tomanage the funds. We have to work with absurdly heavy procedures
imposed by Member States wanting to micromanage projects, and to
secure contracts. As a result, in the last 5 years the average delay in
disbursement  of committed funds has increased from 3 years to 4.5 years.
For certain programmes the backlog of outstanding commitments is
equivalent to more than 8.5 years' payments.
14. Last month we announced  our plans to clean up this mess. We are
proposing to the budgetary authority that a proportion of each assistance
programme should be committed to its management. With these
additional  resources:
o We can do a better job of multiannual programming, and seek to
involve the Member States at that stage, so that they do not delay the
projects themselves by excessive oversight procedures.
r  We can create a single office of the Commission, to be called
EuropeAid, which will identify projects and then oversee their
implementation,  from start to finish.
o And we can devolve more work to our overseas delegations,  bringing
management nearer to the projects themselves, and involving
beneficiary  countries more closely in decision-making.
15. This is perhaps my highest single priority in my present job -
working closely with Poul Nielson who has particular responsibility for
development co-operation. If we cannot manage our funds effectively, w€
should not manage them at all. Yet if funds are we| managed, external
assistance is an area where there is an obvious uulu.-added in action at a
Community level.
16. Nowhere is it more important that we should be fast and effective
in delivering assistance than in the WesternBalkans. This region poses a
tremendous challenge for Europe and for CFSP - and for me and Javier
Solana in particular. I was delighted when PresidentChirac announced, in
his speech of 30 Muy, that the Balkans would be at the top of the French
Presidency's CFSP agenda. I welcome the prospect of another Summit, as
I welcome his call for a more coherent, forceful and determined  strategy.
The Commission  has explained in some detail what such a strategy means
in terms of EU spending. The EU's overall approach is clear. We are
working for:
o the gradual integration of these countries into the Union by way of
Stabilis ation and Association Agreetnents;o that will involve the regeneration of these economies throughintra-
regional trade, as well as through asymmetric trade concessions by the
EU to encourage the transition towards free trade;
o but in the first instance it means the most rapid possible reconstruction
of shattered lives, shattered societies and shattered infrastructure.  Not
only have we established a Reconstruction Agency to oversee this
work in Kosovo, but we have proposed a new Regulation  to draw rhe
work together within a single legal instrument;
In all this we are working closely with the IIN and with the Stability Pact
under Bodo Hombach. There is a huge job to be done.
17. These are not inherently wicked or violent societies. They are
people, rather, still living with the consequences of a flawed regional
construction following the Congress of Berlin more than a hundred years
ago. And in Serbia they are suffering under appalling leadership. Despite
some encouraging  developments, such as recent changes in Croatia, the
present reality is ugly. We must light the path to Europe.
18. In the Mediterranean,  too, the EU has the capacity to make a real
difference. Not so long ago the EU's Mediterranean policy was conceived
primarily in terms of development co-operation.  That time has long
passed. We do have a massive developmentprogramme,  of course. It has
grown exponentially  in recent years, and now represents about a quarter
of the Union's entire external assistance effort. But aid is only one facet
of a much wider policy. Five years ago we launched the Euro-
Mediterranean  Partnership - the so-called "Barcelona Process". We are
seeking a shared area of peace, prosperity and security to our south,
rooted in free trade - the Mediterranean equivalent of NAFTA. We seek
to promote human rights, democracy and the rule of law throughout the
region. And we seek a co-operative  partnership  that can help to sustain
the coming peace in the Middle East.
19. There is a risk that words like partnership  become mere platitudes
of diplomatic intercourse if they are not backed by hard targets and
timetables. That is why I am determined to relaunch the Barcelona
Process. Ministers have called on the European Commission to propose
ideas before the summer break.
20. I could continue on a world tour almost indefinitely - indeed my
present life sometimes feels like that: imprisoned inaeroplanes. You will
be relieved to hear that I do not propose in this speech to expand on theambition or the reality of the EU's engagement in Latin America, or
Aftica, or Asia, or in the Middle East. Let me conclude, however, with
brief comments on three further topics of particular importance  for
Europe's whole future: Russia; the EU's imminent enlargement; and the
beginnings of an independent  European military capacity.
21. Russia, first, whose transformation has been one of the most
significant  feafures of the last 50 years. Russia's future relationship  with
the EU is an issue of profound importance for our continent - and it
remains a conundrum. For Russia is undoubtedly  European. But she is
not western. Russia a great power. Yet her enfeebled economy is only
8oh the size of the EU's while depending on us for 40oh of its external
trade. Where does this leave our long-term relationship? And where does
it leave countries from Central Asia to the Caucasus to Ukraine which lie
between the great continental poles? This is a question which can
provoke passionate theoretical debate about the geographical  limits of the
Union; and about religious and cultural divides. My own approach is
pragmatic. Our interest and our obligation is to engage with all these
countries, and with Russia above all, to help them develop the structures
they need for sound economic and political development. Let us focus,
for now, on that priority.
22. The Russians have always placed greater faith in strong leaders
than in strong institutions. But if they are now to attract investment; if
they are to overcome their huge problems of nuclear safety; if they are to
defeat their cancer of comrption and fraud; if they are to reemerge, in
short, as the greaf power they should be - they need strong and effective
institutions to underpin the rule of law. No amount of good laws will
make any difference if they cannot be applied in practice, and if the
courts are too weak to enforce them.
23. The EU is keen to work in partnership with Russia. At the EU-
Russia Summit in Moscow at the end of last month I could sense the hope
of a fresh start under Mr Putin. But we can only help if Russia shows its
own commitment to individual rights and the rule of law. Events in
Chechnya continue to cast a long shadow.
24. As I said, the future of Russia has a profound bearing on theEU's
own enlargement, which is going to transform the European Union over
the coming years. The full implications of taking in so many new
members  are impossible to predict. It will require radical changes in our
present institutions, which has already provoked the fascinating  debate
launched by Joschka Fischer last month. I will not join that debate here
except to say that while I have some sympathy for Joschka's  conception
of nation states sharing sovereignty within a constitutional contractsubject to greater democratic control and accountability, I am concerned
that powers should be vested upwards from the separate nations in the
cenffal structure that is created - not downwards from that structure.
Nation states are the basic political unit and will remain the main focus of
public loyalry. Enlargement of the EU will also require radical changes in
EU policies, including the Common Agricultural Policy. That could be a
helpful stimulus, and not a disbenefit of enlargement, if we approach it
sensibly.
25. Whatever its structural and policy consequences, enlargement
constitutes the single greatest contribution  the EU can make to European
- even to global - stability. I see theprojection of stability as theEU's
essential mission, and the central objective of CFSP. The enlargement  of
the EU itself is the greatest example of that policy. We have already seen,
in Greece, Spain and Portugal, how membership of the EU has helped to
stabilise countries emerging from dictatorship.
26. Finally, I promised to say a few words about security, and the
Commission's role within the emerging structures. Heads of Government
have stated their immediate goal very clearly. By the year 2003 they want
to be able to deploy 50 - 60 000 troops capable of the full range of what
are known as the Petersberg tasks: humanitarian and rescue work, crisis
management, peace-keeping, and even peace-grqking. The French have
made clear their determination to drive full throttle for that goal during
their Presidency. Javier Solana is deeply involved both on the operational
side, building command and control structures for European operations,
and on the institutional side, too, tackling the complexities of the EU-
NATO relationship including the involvement of non-NATO  members of
the EU and non-EU members of NATO. All this is work that I strongly
support. Yet I do so in many respects as an interested observer rather than
as a conffibutor.
27 .  Does this mean that the Commission should keep out of the whole
field? Some - even in this hall perhaps - would answer yes: military
questions are for the Member States, and the Community institutions
should mind their own business. That is wrons for two reasons at least:
o First, while the Commission  has nothing to say - nor do we seek a role
- in defence, it is impossible to separate purely military matters from
related issues in which we are competent, and have a real contribution
to make. Military and the non-military actions cannot be placed neatly
into separate boxes. Not should they be, because they need to be
closely co-ordinated in the service of a single strategy. The
Commission, for example, may be bankrolling police support to helphead off a conflict; or we may be arranging the training of border
services where uncontrolled mass migration is generating conflict; or
we may be helping to re-establish adminisffative structures in
countries emerging from crisis - as we see in the Balkans today. The
Commission has an impressive range of instruments  and expertise
which need to be incorporated into theEU's overall approach in crisis
situations -  from de-mining projects to mediation to support for
independent media. All this means that we need to be involved in the
day to day work of the emerging security sffuctures of the EU. The
Commission is currently working with the Member States to deveiop
non-military  headline goals that will complement  the military goal.
o The second reason it makes no sense to try to fence off the emerging
security structures from the Commission is that defence trade and
production cannot be treated as a chasse gard6e within the Single
Market. Competition between defence companies. Research and
development.  Exports of defence equipment. Internal market aspects
of defence trade, and dual-use goods which have civil as well as
military applications. All these are areas in which the benefits of the
Single Market should not be denied to European industry.
28. These are areas in which the Commission  needs to tread with great
sensitivity. As I have said, we do not seek a role in defence or military
decision-making. But I would plead for the indivisibility of European
foreign policy, which cannot be confined to one pillar of the Treaty. The
Commission needs to be fully associated with all of CFSP.
Let me conclude with this:
29. The Common Foreign and Security Policy has developed slowly in
the European Union, and is still weak, because it is an area in which the
Member States are rightly jealous of their national prerogatives. There are
distinct limits on how far they want to go in pooling their capacity, and
on how much they want to spend. But in recent years they have begun to
fashion a Common Foreign and Security Policy which can be more than
just declaratory. And they have recognised that this needs to integrate
three strands: national policies, Community policies, and CFSP itself (the
so-called 'Second Pillar'). European foreign policy must combine all
three, and it will become stronger as that combination becomes seamless.
30. The Commission  will play its role in this important work. If CFSP
is to be taken seriously, this will involve hard choices. The Commission
will try to make Member States face up to those choices, which will
sometimes mean saying things that are unpopular. We shall tell theMember States, for example, when we consider that they are willing the
end without providing the budgetary means. But if we are to do that we
must retain the independence  which is our strength as an institution.
31.  Europe's foreign policy ambition should extend a long way
beyond the present reality. CFSP is still in its infancy. If it is to grow to
maturify it needs the nurture of both its parents: the member states, and
the Community institutions. And - as any psychologist will tell you - the
child is more likely to be happy and healthy if those parents love one
another.
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Security aspects including liaison with WEU and NATO
GLOSSARY  OF ESDP-RELATED  ACRONYMS AND EXPRESSIONS
KEY EXPRESSIONS
AFOR -Albania Force
Force Designated by the Alliance to support humanitarian  efforts in Albanra durins
the Kosovo crisis.
CFE -Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
The CFE Treaty is a major arrns supervise treaty and a cornerstone of European
security. More than 58,000 pieces of military equipment have been destroyed  in
Europe since NATO Allies and members of the then Warsarv Treaty Organisation
signed the CFE in 1990. In March 1999, Russia, NATo and other European stares
reached agreement  on all major CFE issues, opening the rvay for the adaptation of the
CFE Treaty in time for the Summit of the Organisation  for Security and Cooperation
in Europe in Istanbul in November 1999.
EAPC -The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
Set up in May 1997 as the successor to the North Atlantic Cooperation  Council, the
EAPC provides  the overarching framervork  for an expanded  political dimension to
PfP and for closer practical cooperation. It brings together representatives of the
NATO Allies and Parlners - 44 countries in all. A Summit Meeting of EAPC Heads
of State and Government  was held in wasl,ington  in April 1999, the day after the
NATO Summit.
EPC - European Political Cooperation
System of cooperation  in the field of foreign policy adopted  by the Foreign Ministers
in Luxembourg on 27 october 1970. The process was carried out by consulting
regularly, harmonizing views, concerting  attitudes and, where possible, undertaking
joint action. The process was put on a more formal basis in the Single European ACt
in 1986 giving to it a Treaty foundation.  Its scope was 'any foreign policy matters of
general interest'. In 1992 the EPC was replaced  by the CFSP in the Treaty of the
European  Union.ESDI -European Security and Defence Identity
The aim of developing ESDI within the Alliance  is to enable all European Allies to
make a more coherent and effective contribution to NATO as an expression of their
shared responsibilities, and to reinforce the transatlantic  partnership while at the same
time enabling them to act together in a European context. ESDI is an essential part of
the adaptation of Alliance  structures.
KFOR -Kosovo Force
Multinational force established in Kosovo under the auspices of the United Nations,
in accordance  with LII { Security Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999. An advance
enabling force for KFOR was stationed in the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia 1 by NATO in anticipation of a settlement. These troops were placed
under the operational  supervise  of the Commander of the Allied Command Europe
(ACE) Rapid Reaction  Corps (ARRC) at the start of NATO's air campaign at the end
of March. They were subsequently reassigned  to humanitarian  tasks in response to the
escalating refugee crisis. With additional forces sent to the region, these forces
fulfilled essential  tasks in providing  direct support to the refugees in the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  as well as assisting the international humanitarian
agencies.
NAC -North Atlantic Council
Comprised of representatives of the Alliance's member countries this is the
organisation's highest decision-making body. It meets regularly in Brussels at the
level of Ambassadors, at least twice a year at the level of Foreign and Defence
Ministers and occasionally - as in Washington  in 1999 - in summit session at the
level of Heads of State and Government.
NATO-RUSSIA PJC -Permanent  Joint Council
The PJC rvas established under the NATO-Russia Founding  Act signed in May 1997.
The Founding Act provides for regular meetings of the PJC at ambassadorial level as
well as bi-annual  meetings at the level of Foreign Ministers. Its purpose is to provide
a venue for consultation, cooperation and consensus-building  in discussions of
political and security matters.
Following the beginning of Allied air operations to bring about an end to the conflict
of Kosovo, Russia suspended its participation in this forum. The Alliance expressed
its regret at this decision, recognising  its common interests with Russia in reaching a
political solution to the crisis in Kosovo. NATO countries continued to work closely
with Russia in the context of diplomatic initiatives to end the conflict.
NATO-UKRAINE COMMISSION
The NATO-Ukraine Commission  was established  under the terms of the Charter on a
Distinctive Partnership between  NATO and Ukraine. The Commission  meets at least
twice a year to review progress in the development of the relationship between NATOand Ukraine. A Summit session of Heads of State and Government of the Allies and
Ukraine was held in Washington  on 24 Apnl1999.
PARP -PfP Planning and Review Process
PARP was established in November 1994 as a separate activity within the Partnership
for Peace programme,  for those Partner countries wishing to participate. It aims to en
courage transparency in defence planning and to develop the interoperability  of
Partner country forces with those of NATO countries,  by developing and reviewing
mutually agreed planning targets. Seventeen  Partner countries  currently participate in
PARP.
Petersberg Tasks
They were defined by the WEU during its meeting of 19 June 1992 and, then adopted
by the EU with the Treaty of Amsterdam.  They include humanitarian action and
rescue, peacekeeping and crisis management, including  peace-making  operations if
required with adequate military  forces.
PfP -Partnership for Peace
Set up in January 1994, PfP offers the Alliance's Partners  the opportunity  to take parr,
with NATO, in security cooperation  programmes tailored to their individual
requirements. These include activities such as military exercises and civil emergency
operations. PfP has been enhanced to give Partners  greater say in plaruring  and
directing future programmes. There are currently 24 PfP countries.
PPEWU - Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit
Set up in January 2000, after the agreement  reached  at the Helsinki Conference,  the
PPEWU will monitor and analyse developments in areas relevant to the CFSP, will
provide assessments  of the Union's foreign and security policy interests as well as
timely assessments and early waming of events or situations which may have
significant repercussions for the Union's foreign and security policy. Finally, it will
be in charge of producing analyses, reccommendations  and strategies for the CFSP.
PSC - Political and Securitv Committee; MC - Military Committee;  MS -
Military Stuff
The three bodies of a permanent structure to be prepared by an interim political-
military body of the European Council by March 2000. Modeled on NATO, the PSC,
normally constituted  at its highest level by foreign and defense ministers, is to
exercise the political control and strategic direction of military operations  in a crisis. It
would be advised by a military committee,  formed by their chiefs of defense,  who
would give military directives to the military staff. The latter, representatives of all
branches of the member nations' armed forces, would provide expert advice to the
military committee and assume the conduct of military operations.SACEUR and SACLA|IT -The Supreme Allied Commander Europe and The
Supreme AIIied Commander Atlantic
SACEUR and SACLANT  are the two major commanders responsible for the
Alliance's integrated military structure.
SFOR and IFOR
The NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR)  has been deployed in Bosnia and
Herzegovina  since December  1996 as part of efforts to underpin the Dayton Peace
Agreement  in the former Yugoslavia. It replaced the Implementation Force (IFOR),
which was responsible for overseeing the fulfilment of the military aspects of the
peace agreement.  More than 35 NATO and non-NATO  countries have contributed
forces to SFOR, whose strength totals more than 30,000 troops.
SHAPE -Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
Located near Mons, Belgium, this is the headquarters  of Allied Command  Europe.
Strategic Concept
The Strategic Concept is the authoritative statement of the Alliance's objectives  and
provides the highest level guidance on the political and military means to be used in
achieving  them. It sets out the rationale for the Alliance  and its activities, and
provides the NATO Military Authorities direction for developing military capabilities
and preparing  for possible operations. The Strategic Concept was first published  in
1991, after the two meetings of the North Atlantic Council in London and Rome. The
most recent version of the Strategic Concept was approved and published  at the
Washington  Summit in 1999.
In addition to taking account of politicaland military developments  since 1991, the
Strategic Concept confirms the Alliance's commitment to maintaining collective
defence  and the transatlantic  link.
ABBREVATIONS IN COMMON  USE
ACA - Agency for the Control of Armaments
ACLANT - Allied Command Atlantic
AFCENT - Allied Forces Central Europe
AFNORTH - Allied Forces Northem Europe
AFSOUTH - Allied Forces Southern Europe
APAG - Atlantic Policy Advisory Group
ATA - Atlantic Treaty Association
C4I * Command, control, communications,  computers and intelligence
CEAC - Committee for European Airspace Coordination
CENTAG - Central Army Group, Central Europe
CENTAG - Central Army Group, Central Europe
CEOA - Central Europe Operating Agency
CHODs - Chiefs of Defence StaffCIS - Commonwealth of Independent States
CIS - Communications  and Information  Systems
CISC - Communications  and Information  Systems Committee
CJPS - Combined Joint Task Forces
COREPER - Committee  of the Permanent Representatives (European Council)
CSCE - Conference on Security and Cooperation  in Europe
CWG - Council Working Group
DPC - Defence Planning  Committee
DRC - Defence Review Committee
DRG - Defence Representatives Group
ECSC - European Coal and Steel Community
EDC - European Defence Community
EDIG - European Defence Industry Group
EEC - European Economic Community
ESA - European Space Agency
EUCLID - European Cooperation  for the Long Term in Defence
EW - Electronic Warfare
EWG - Executive Working Group
FAWEU - Forces answerable to WEU
GIS - Geographical  Information  Survey
HLTF - High Level Task Force
IEPG - Independent European Programme Group
ISS - Institute for Security Studies
IISS - Institute for International Strategic Studies
IMS - International Military Staff
LTDP - Long-Term defence Programme
MAPE/MAPEXT - Multinational Advisory Police Element/Extended  mandare
MARAIRMED - Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean
MDG - Military Delegates Group
MDWG - Military Delegates Working  Group
MNPF - Multinational Police Force
MNC - Major NATO Commander
NAA - North Atlantic Assembly
NACC - North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NACISA - NATO Communications  and Information  Systems Agency
NACMA - NATO Air Command Control Systems Management Agency
NADs - National Armaments Directors
NAVOCFORMED - NATO On-Call Force, Medirerranean
NBC - nuclear, biological  and chemical  weapons
NIAG - NATO Industrial Advisory  Group
NICS - NATO Integrated Communications System
NMD - National Missile Defence (US)
NPG - Nuclear Planning  Group (NATO)
NSC - NATO Supply Centre
OECD - Organisation  for Economic  Cooperation  and Development
PMG - Politico-Military  Group
PMWG - Politico-Military  Working  Group
PSC - Political and Security  Committee
SAC - Standing Armaments  Committee
SAC - Strateeic Air CommandSC - Security Committee
SDI - Strategic Defence Initiative
SG - Space Group
SHAPE - Supreme  Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SIAF - Spanish-Italian  Amphibious Force
SNF - Short-Range Nuclear Forces
STANAVFORCHAN - Standing Naval Force Channel
STANAVFORLANT  - Standing Naval Force Atlantic
STANAVFORMED - Standing Naval Force Mediterrenean
SWG - Special Working Group
TNF - Theatre Nuclear Forces
UN - United Nations
LINCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
LINHCR - United Nations High Comission  on Refugees
UXO - Un-exploded ordinance
WEAG - Westem European Armaments  Group
WEAO - Western European Armaments  Organisation
WELG - Westem European Logistics Group
WEUCOM - WEU telecommunications  network
WEUDAM - WEU Demining Advisory Mission
WMWG - WEU Mobility Working Group
WSMWG - WEU Strategic Mobility Group